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Abstract: Greater scrutiny and demands for innovation and increased productivity place pressures 
on scientists. Forensic genetics is advancing at a rapid pace but can only do so responsibly, usefully, 
and acceptably within ethical and legal boundaries. We argue that such boundaries require that 
forensic scientists embrace ‘ethics as lived practice’. As a starting point, we critically discuss ‘thin’ 
ethics in forensic genetics, which lead to a myopic focus on procedures, and to seeing ‘privacy’ as 
the sole ethical concern and technology as a mere tool. To overcome ‘thin’ ethics in forensic genetics, 
we instead propose understanding ethics as an intrinsic part of the lived practice of a scientist. 
Therefore, we explore, within the context of three case studies of emerging forensic genetics tech-
nologies, ethical aspects of decision-making in forensic genetics research and in technology use. We 
discuss the creation, curation, and use of databases, and the need to engage with societal and polic-
ing contexts of forensic practice. We argue that open communication is a vital ethical aspect. Adop-
tion of ‘ethics as lived practice’ supports the development of anticipatory capacity—empowering 
scientists to understand, and act within ethical and legal boundaries, incorporating the operational 
and societal impacts of their daily decisions, and making visible ethical decision making in scientific 
practice. 
Keywords: ethics; forensic genetics; ethics as lived practice; decision-making; genetic databasing; 
forensic DNA phenotyping; forensic genealogy; forensic epigenetics; communication; database 
 
1. Introduction 
Ethical principles and their application in practice have come to matter to many in-
dividual forensic geneticists, working to ensure that, while the scientific foundation of the 
techniques they are developing and deploying for casework is reliable, they are also con-
tributing to a just society. Yet forensic genetics as a discipline and a community of prac-
tice—research scientists, laboratory practitioners, journals, industry, professional bodies, 
and users of forensic genetic analyses in policing and elsewhere—continue to face scruti-
nize new and emerging forensic genetic technologies for their social, ethical, and legal 
ramifications, alongside their scientific and technical dimensions. For example, the Ger-
man Government led an inquiry into forensic DNA phenotyping and biogeographic an-
cestry testing between 2017 and 2019, leading to the legalisation of the former in 2019, but 
not of the latter, due to concerns around racial profiling [1]. The Law Commission of New 
Zealand reported on new and emergent forensic genetics in 2020, recommending the 
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comprehensive revision of legislation; increased oversight; and greater consideration of 
concerns surrounding privacy and discrimination [2]. The Law Commission of Ontario 
reviewed Artificial Intelligence (AI) and probabilistic genotyping DNA tools in June 2021, 
suggesting that inherent biases in these technologies challenge the notion of DNA profil-
ing as a “gold standard” and requires that there is continuous scrutiny as well as new 
legislation [3]. The Scottish Government and the UK House of Lords have commenced 
parallel enquiries into developments in technologies for policing in 2021 [4,5], scoping 
opportunities, and challenges arising for policing from new technologies. 
While these enquiries are undertaken, reports published, and debates held, demand 
continues for the utility of databases (including genetic ones) to be maximised, and the 
promise of forensic genetics—often portrayed as the greatest crime-fighting tool since fin-
gerprinting—be realised and capitalised upon. Meanwhile, new techniques are being de-
veloped and debated. Despite remaining contentious, internationally, the use of genetic 
‘phenotyping’ in police investigations is growing. The Swiss Parliament is the latest to 
prepare legislation to allow for forensic DNA phenotyping amidst, both, supportive and 
critical debate [6]. Similarly, since 2018, forays into forensic genetic genealogy have been 
spreading since the successful detection of the perpetrator with the help of the technique 
in the ‘Golden State Killer’ case in the USA [7–10]. 
In these areas, as well as generally, forensic scientists face institutional pressures, 
both from casework and their scientific community (including employers/funders), which 
must be met with scientific professionalism and ethical practice. Yet it was not long ago 
that scientists themselves conceded that forensic science ‘is not sufficiently well developed 
as a profession’ ( p. 523, [11]). Within the scientific community, there is increased scrutiny 
regarding the way that data are sourced and shared, informing both forensic research and 
casework analysis [12]. The intensification of external scrutiny, and productivity pressures 
demand the highest levels of professionalism, which must include a strong, internalized 
code of ethics that has not yet been proven to be universal [13]. 
In some parts of the world, forensic genetics research and casework have become an 
important aspect of policing, criminal justice, and victim identification. In multiple ways, 
forensic genetics contributes to rendering these domains more agile vis-à-vis existing and 
emerging demands and challenges. Novel technologies are developed in response to sci-
entific insights and practical problems while remaining subject to the same responsibilities 
that scientists and users have towards their specific institutions, disciplines, and to society 
as a whole. 
Therefore, in this paper, we offer an approach through which the forensic genetics 
community can reflect on their daily decisions in both scientific research and casework as 
part of their professional and ethical forensic practice. While we cannot, nor do we aim to, 
provide technical or legal solutions, we offer a framework for ethical conduct. We consider 
the problem of ‘thin’ ethics in forensic genetics and propose understanding ethics as an 
intrinsic part of the lived practice of a scientist. We aim to support scientists in developing 
anticipatory capacity [14]—to understand the wider operational and societal impacts of 
their daily decisions around forensic genetics—by making visible the ethical decisions in 
both their scientific practice and in the application and implementation of forensic tech-
nologies. We do so by exploring ethical aspects of decision-making in forensic genetics 
and illustrating the discussion by way of three case studies of emerging forensic genetics 
technologies. 
2. Materials and Methods 
This paper builds on literature analysed in three previous reviews of social and ethi-
cal aspects of scientific, technological, and operational developments in forensic genetics 
[15–17], adding consideration of scholarship published since 2017, and focusing on three 
technologies currently being debated: forensic DNA phenotyping (FDP), forensic genetic 
genealogy (FGG), and forensic epigenetics (FEpi). In this endeavour, the concept of the 
“social life of DNA,” proposed by Corinna Kruse [18], which captures the different social 
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relationships observed in the processing of DNA as it moves from crime scene to court-
room, resonates. As such, we analyse the different life stages of advanced forensic DNA 
technologies. While DNA profiling is a relatively widely accepted technology, having sta-
bilized and been implemented across different contexts, the three technologies we focus 
on are yet to reach such a point of stability. In reviewing these examples, we highlight key 
ethical concerns to assist forensic practitioners in expanding their anticipatory capacity 
and thus work towards ethically sound decision making. By anticipatory capacity, we re-
fer to antecedent considerations in science, and in real-world application of science, set 
within a wider context of liberal-democratic social and cultural norms and values. These 
three technologies were selected, firstly, due to controversy concerning their utility and 
reliability/validity specifically, and their ethics more generally [19,20]. Secondly, these 
technologies present opportunities to engage with ethics as lived practice, as they pose 
ethical dilemmas. Thirdly, debates are ongoing over their use, and measures in place to 
regulate these technologies differ across countries. Finally, each of these technologies is 
currently at different life stages. Forensic DNA phenotyping, although still the subject of 
complex politics of legitimation and contestation [20–23], is currently regulated and ap-
plied in some countries such as Slovakia and Germany. Forensic genetic genealogy is un-
der intense scrutiny in many jurisdictions and upcoming regulation can be expected (see 
for example recent initiatives in the USA and in Australia). Forensic epigenetics is being 
developed and has not (yet) been considered widely with respect to regulation and/or 
application. 
3. The Limitations of “Thin” Ethics in Forensic Genetics 
Controversies surrounding advances in forensic genetics could (at least in part) be a 
consequence of a structural deficiency in comprehensive, systematic understandings of 
what ethics is—or should be—in forensic genetics and related technological innovations. 
Let us explain what we mean by a “thin” understanding of ethics. 
Firstly, forensic geneticists will encounter ethics as part of an administrative process 
to be followed to enable research, innovation, and implementation: following codes of 
practice, completing forms, attending training, and submitting authorizations to some 
form of the institutional oversight body. Such administrative tasks and tools are clearly 
essential in ensuring forensic scientists navigate the most basic rules of research and tech-
nology use. However, the main thrust of this ‘procedural ethics’ [24] is to comply with 
administrative and legal procedural requirements, with ethics conceived of as ‘passive’, 
lending itself to the interpretation of ethics as a hurdle to research, innovation, and (posi-
tive) societal impact that forensic genetics could otherwise make. Consequently, exclusive 
adherence to this “thin” procedural ethics can extinguish the light that a (pro-)active ap-
proach can shine on the complex environment within which forensic work takes place. It 
also ‘disengages’ forensic geneticists (both in research and casework) from ethics to the 
detriment of forensic genetics, and more widely to science in the criminal justice system. 
Secondly, within this “thin” understanding of ethics, ‘privacy’ tends to be perceived 
as an interpretable legal concept, addressed by compliance with the law. Moreover, ‘data 
protection’ is often used as a proxy for ‘privacy’, whereby observance with principles of 
data protection will suffice, yet ‘privacy’ is far more expansive and manifold than mere 
data protection (pp. 33–50, [25,26]). A reductionist understanding of ethics as privacy ob-
scures other vital aspects of ethical practice, including attending to justice and fairness, 
human dignity (and its cultural values, see, e.g., recommendations by the Law Commis-
sion of New Zealand vis-a-vis forensic genetics and the Māori), and the physical and in-
formational integrity of a person and/or a group of persons (community). A focus on pri-
vacy also misdirects debate into a cul-de-sac of arguments over balancing ‘personal pri-
vacy’ with ‘public security’ since this dichotomy is erroneous; privacy and security are 
symbiotic [27,28]. 
Thirdly, technology may be perceived as a mere tool, process, or method. However, 
as several years of consolidated scientific research have shown (particularly in social 
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studies of science and technology in health research, and more recently in the social stud-
ies of forensic science), technology is a product of social, cultural, and moral facets of so-
ciety. Technology is always technology-in-practice [29] resulting from, and shaping social 
interactions and the organisation of social life. As Greenhalgh and Swinglehurst (p. 3, [30]) 
suggest, considering technology as social practices “moves us on from studying either 
people or technologies” towards a rich, inclusive analysis of technology as an aspect of 
social life, considering technology-in-use as well as the discourses and practices of tech-
nology [31]. 
Reducing technology to its instrumental aspects conceals many ethical decisions that 
shape technology, from its conception to application and maintenance as well as to its 
oversight. Thus, we consider “thin” or ‘procedural ethics’ insufficient in forensic research 
and application, with privacy as just one ethical concern. Nor is technology a mere tool or 
method but should be viewed as social practice. Thus, we propose an approach to ethics 
as intrinsic to the lived practice of forensic geneticists, making deliberate decisions about 
daily practices and procedures, acting in light of these decisions, while continually reflect-
ing upon their broader impacts now and in the future. 
4. Ethics as Lived Practice 
Ethics as lived practice extends throughout the life cycle of science: from develop-
ment and implementation to regulation and oversight. Regardless, then, of the role(s) that 
professionals fulfil—whether as research scientist engaged with the laboratory-based de-
velopment of forensic applications; as a forensic practitioner working on criminal cases; 
as an expert advising on casework or giving evidence in court—ethical engagement is 
inalienably part of professional practice. Such ethical engagement is inescapable because 
(i) the development of forensic technologies will affect human beings; (ii) those conduct-
ing forensic casework, and working with forensic data and information, are, as all other 
human beings, subjective, open to influence, and fallible; and (iii) forensic casework builds 
upon and contributes to selecting, categorising, and curating data and data repositories 
as reference points, thus making choices that will affect future forensic research and case-
work, and as such, many more humans. 
Our understanding of ethics as lived practice stands in contrast to the notion of ethics 
as a necessary evil and to the “thin” ethics discussed above—where ethics only arise at 
bounded points in time when the ethics ‘hurdle’ is jumped. Ethics as lived practice, in-
stead, recognises that decision-making is ongoing, and an intrinsic part of the practice. 
Continual reflection, then, becomes central: taking time, sometimes briefly, sometimes for 
a longer period; alone or as a team; discipline; or community, to (re)consider the basis and 
motivations on which decisions are being taken, as well as their consequences. This also 
calls for serious engagement with others, including those from outside the laboratory 
(such as criminal investigators, social scientists, policymakers forging legislation and reg-
ulation, as well as the civil society), to discuss research, analysis, and future application, 
within their wider social and cultural contexts. We call upon the forensic genetics com-
munity to build on emerging strengths here by making ethical reflection—as a way of 
building anticipatory capacity—an integral part of forensic genetics work. 
The remarkable potential of forensic science, to not only contribute to the pursuit of 
justice, but to shape and direct society, is highly valued, but comes with enormous re-
sponsibility. Acknowledgment of the wider impact of forensic work means that ethics 
ought to be reflected in scientists’ and practitioners’ training, in their daily decision-mak-
ing, and in contributions to scientific and public debates about forensics. Guillemin and 
Guillam [24] explain that ethics work occurs in researchers’ daily practice beyond proce-
dural ethics. Such a practice-related understanding of ethics has been suggested as a way 
of incorporating principle-based reflections about the impact and implications of scientific 
design and work into everyday decisions [32]. Furthermore, Guillemin and Guillam sug-
gest that researchers may encounter ethically relevant moments, where the approach 
taken or decision made has important ethical ramifications, but where researchers do not 
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necessarily feel themselves to be on the horns of a dilemma. In fact, in some cases, it might 
be clear how the researcher should respond or proceed, and yet there is still something 
ethically important at stake (p. 265, [24]). While the scientist or practitioner might not per-
ceive this moment as particularly vital or difficult, the decisions made at this moment can 
have significant long-term implications and impacts: on the person making the decision 
and their forensic specialism; on forensic science more widely and its perception among 
users, policy and publics; on the domains using forensic science services; and, via these 
domains, on ethical issues such as: social justice; equality; equity; dignity; privacy; integ-
rity, and so forth. In these ‘ethical moments’ (for a look at ethical moments in forensic 
genetics, see e.g., [33]) different perspectives are brought together, to identify and resolve 
disagreements, making visible ethical reasoning about scientific practice and the use of 
scientific knowledge [20]. 
Consider, for example, the forensic scientist tracing a partial DNA match indicative 
of a familial relationship between a suspect DNA profile and that of a dragnet/mass test 
volunteer. If permitted by law, the modus operandi is clear, and the practitioner should 
always follow what the law prescribes. However, the law does not, and cannot, provide 
for every situation practitioners will come across in their daily practice. If the law has not 
explicitly provided for a situation, there is a significant decision to be made: should the 
expert report a partial match and thus a potential familial relationship, even though fa-
milial searching is not explicitly regulated in their jurisdiction? In pursuit of a perpetrator, 
it may be legitimate to report, even if such analyses are not formally accepted practice 
(e.g., not regulated by law, nor a laboratory accredited for), thus shifting the ultimate eth-
ical decision to others, such as the investigating judge (in predominantly inquisitorial sys-
tems) or the police and prosecution (in more adversarial systems). Nonetheless, the foren-
sic geneticist is required to make an ethical decision about their practice at this point, and 
procedures to support them in doing so—perhaps by calling on them to reflect upon their 
decision—may often be non-existent or very limited. This example, like many others oc-
curring daily in forensic genetics, clearly demonstrates that ethics cannot be limited to an 
initial passing of a procedural ethical hurdle, but relies on many decisions around relia-
bility, utility, and legitimacy [20] that an individual or their team take in forensic research 
and casework. 
Ethics as lived practice demands more attention, while a “thin” understanding of 
ethics, anchored, for example, in ‘procedural ethics’, is insufficient for responsible (and as 
such also accountable) forensic genetics practice. We argue that ethics as lived practice, 
therefore, means that forensic researchers and practitioners identify and understand the 
need to address opportunities as well as limitations of their work set within an institu-
tional and societal context—e.g., in criminal justice, migration management, or disaster 
victim identification. In the next section, we discuss ethical decision-making in forensic 
genetics practice using the example of data repositories because their creation, curation, 
and use are vital to forensic genetics research and can play a significant role in investiga-
tive work and law enforcement. 
5. Building Upon Strong Foundations: Ethical Decision-Making in Genetic  
Databasing 
Central to forensic genetics is the data collected from individuals from diverse 
groups and curated for use by the scientific community. However, as we show in the ex-
ample of forensic genetic genealogy below, data collected and curated for non-forensic 
purposes are also increasingly of interest to forensic geneticists and law enforcement 
agencies. Data collection and curation in repositories form a key life stage of genetic data 
and ethical considerations in forensic genetics, as with any human genetics field, therefore 
begin with the sampling design for DNA data for research and for databases such as EM-
POP or YHRD. Since some forensic genetics services depend on population data, genetic 
data from diverse populations have been widely collected from individuals across the 
globe for decades. Since the 1970s, the fields of human and medical genetics have 
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developed and adopted a number of ethical standards and procedures, including, most 
notably, requirements for informed consent and approval by ethics committees [34]. Such 
processes have been continuously refined and upgraded, and yet ethical debates around 
genetic data continue [35–39]. 
In contrast, the forensic genetics community’s leading journal, Forensic Science In-
ternational: Genetics, introduced statements about these basic ethical standards (informed 
consent and ethics approval) as a publication requirement as late as 2010 [40]. In 2020, 
guidelines were updated and extended, with a specific focus on population data from 
minorities or indigenous communities [38]. Until 2010, there were no ethical standards for 
authors to meet when publishing DNA data; and data collected before 2010 without in-
formed consent and ethical approval is still used, shared, and uploaded. Furthermore, 
forensic genetic databases usually require the publication of data in peer-reviewed journal 
articles before such data can be uploaded, along with ethical approval and/or evidence of 
informed consent. However, in some databases, data can be uploaded without meeting 
these criteria [41]. Notably, such databases are not only used for research, but also for 
investigation by law enforcement authorities. Ethical debates around these databases 
have only now begun. 
In human genetics, the demands of obtaining consent for samples from sufficiently 
large numbers of individuals requires the building of an ethical regime of institutional 
and personal infrastructures in order to enable the legal and ethical use of samples and 
profiles (e.g., [42]). Numerous ethical decisions, consciously or not, are inevitably made 
when recruiting donors: whom to include or exclude, how to frame the research to donors 
about why samples and data are requested, what to give back to donors and their com-
munity, and so forth. In forensic genetics the stakes are higher, as persuading individuals 
to donate their DNA is challenging. Willingness to donate DNA for forensic purposes 
used to be considerably lower than for health purposes [43]; albeit more recently there has 
been an increase in voluntary offers of existing genetic profiles or donation of new genetic 
data to enable the forensic use of ancestry, health, and research databases [8]. Such dona-
tions place a particular responsibility upon researchers and analysts to be very clear about 
the potential uses of such data, not only at the time of sample collection but also after-
wards, as data moves along different life stages. 
For such data repositories to serve law enforcement, data acquisition needs to be as 
extensive as possible to represent diverse populations. Previous resolutions to this prob-
lem have attracted criticism: E.g. some forensic practitioners have argued that overrepre-
sentation of marginalised minorities on databases means they are more likely to be exon-
erated, but this theory has yet to be supported with evidence while emerging database 
uses for biogeographic ancestry testing and capacities to de-anonymize profiles increase 
the riskiness of overrepresentation [12]. Another example is that in China, but also in nu-
merous other countries, police and security forces have been involved in collection efforts, 
nullifying any supposed ‘consent’ [1,41,44,45]. Recent discussions focus upon the reuse of 
data and samples previously collected under unclear ethical conditions, or without any 
demonstrable adherence to ethical principles [1,12]. Some of these datasets have been ob-
tained from vulnerable populations and shared by, and between researchers from foren-
sic, medical, and population genetics, raising serious questions about whether such data 
transfers violate general ethical standards. 
Even if data have been sampled ethically and safely stored in databases, to be used 
as training and test data in calibration exercises, or as reference data for criminal investi-
gative application, social and ethical issues may still arise. A key issue is whether the data 
is representative of the ‘target’ population [1]. Yet rarely discussed are potential problems 
arising from non-representative data collection. For example, if the training data for an 
FDP application has been sampled too selectively (e.g., [46]) and hence is very homoge-
neous, probability calculations might be overly optimistic. Then, in a criminal investiga-
tion, the technology will overestimate its own reliability against the backdrop of a local 
population that is not as homogeneous as the training data. In biogeographic ancestry 
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testing (BGA), so-called “mixed populations” in training and reference data lead to erro-
neous test results and overly optimistic reliability estimates [47]. However, “mixed ances-
tries” will most likely be more commonplace in real life but, in a worst-case scenario, the 
technology will produce erroneously high probability estimates, and yet these are more 
likely to be trusted than other evidence-based on perceptions of scientific objectivity and 
DNA’s standing as “biological witness”—and thus risk leading investigations astray [45]. 
It is critical, therefore, that ethics as lived practice commences at the very first life 
stages of DNA data: when collecting and curating data and establishing repositories. As 
this DNA data is then utilised by forensic practitioners within the context of the criminal 
justice system, the next vital life stage of forensic genetic data, further ethical decision-
making is required. 
6. Challenges of Context and Communication: Ethical Decision-Making as Forensic  
Expert 
Forensic DNA technologies have been framed by metaphorical affirmations of DNA 
as representing a “truth machine” [48] or the “gold standard” of evidence [49], reflecting 
high expectations based upon unrivalled (alleged) levels of validity, certainty, reliability, 
and objectivity. Besides disregarding issues arising during the “social life of DNA” [18], 
as it moves from crime scene (or database) to court, such metaphors eclipse the challenges 
of communicating probabilistic DNA evidence to non-experts [50,51]. These challenges 
occur at many different contact points: in the regulatory process leading up to new or 
amended laws or regulations; in the training of geneticists and investigators; in public 
communications during police investigations; during and after a trial; and in the after-
math of a solved case when the efficiency of different investigative tools is compared and 
highlighted. In addition, as DNA analysis becomes more sensitive (entailing the analysis 
of mixed traces, DNA transfer, etc.), and more open to interpretation, it becomes yet more 
challenging to report [52], with scientists deciding whether to apply a probative value to 
a result, or provide an inconclusive result that neither includes or excludes the suspect 
[53]. 
A rational assessment of what advanced DNA profiling techniques can bring to a 
police investigation is essential but rare. For example, in the UK, ‘familial searching’ has 
been available since 2012 and utilised in 120 cases, with just nine reported ‘successes’ [54], 
perhaps challenging proportionality equations over its use. A realistic appraisal must par-
ticularly consider how ‘results’, once outside of a laboratory or research setting such as in 
forensic validation, are applied during real-life criminal investigations. A host of con-
founding variables and diverse considerations come into play during the criminal process, 
which may distort or nullify laboratory results: “while a forensic technique may have a 
valid scientific basis and prove reliable in a laboratory setting, how can it be ascertained 
that it remains reliable when applied in the present case? What are the error rates associ-
ated with the technique, and are there any pertinent factors that could jeopardise the reli-
ability of the testing in this particular instance?” (p. 240, [13]). A forensic scientist engaged 
in ethics as the lived practice may be required to inform these more ‘realistic’ apprecia-
tions of what forensic genetics can and cannot achieve within the context of police inves-
tigations, particularly when asked to deploy advanced techniques. Both law enforcement 
and the public should not be ‘oversold’ benefits that may never be realised outside of a 
research laboratory [33,55]. Our three case studies below address intelligence-related uses 
of forensic genetics in investigations, when arguably, the dangers of over-selling capaci-
ties by forensic scientists and service providers as well as the ready acceptance of such 
leads by investigators in order to progress a complex case, are high. 
Assuming that DNA science moves from investigation onto a later life stage: forensic 
intelligence from genetic genealogy, but perhaps also from other techniques, may lead to 
requests by police for arrest warrants. This potential outcome would require such forensic 
intelligence to be carefully articulated and to take into account the context in which it may 
be used, including institutional policing cultures and wider political debates, e.g., about 
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migration and criminality. In inquisitorial systems (but highly unlikely ever in adversarial 
systems), forensic intelligence may even make it into the report submitted to the investi-
gating judge. At some point, if rarely, forensic experts may be called as witnesses to ex-
plain the intelligence. 
We know for forensic evidence that the judge may be required to take on a “gate-
keeper” role to ensure that “junk science” remains inadmissible at trial. This role and its 
fulfilment has been highly criticized already for adversarial systems where mechanisms 
are in place for contestation [56,57], with conclusions drawn that “scientific illiteracy on 
the part of the legal profession, when coupled with the flaws in forensic science, forms a 
‘toxic combination’” (p. 82, [56]). The trial process rarely affords even the scientifically 
literate much opportunity to interpret and apply ‘correctly’ complex tests (assuming there 
is a ‘correct’ application) for whether scientific evidence is ‘sufficiently reliable’ [58]. In 
addition, such admissibility testing may come too late in the criminal process. Consider, 
too, that in the inquisitorial system forensic expertise is very rarely challenged. Even 
where challenges to scientific information exist, decisions to admit such information at 
trial can appear arbitrary, or inconsistent, with decisions based upon non-scientific criteria 
[59]. 
Scientists, in providing intelligence as well as in giving testimony, are called upon to 
make ethical decisions about which information to present and how it should be best com-
municated. Much work has gone into, e.g., developing verbal scales as equivalents of re-
porting numerical values and effectively interpreting probabilities [60–62]. Forensic ge-
neticists’ adherence to ethical principles and practices in giving testimony, is a key aspect 
of their responsibility as practitioners (see, e.g., [63]), yet can be complicated by different 
scientific, investigative, and juridical pressures and demands on the scientific expert. A 
key responsibility is avoiding ‘over-egging the pudding’. As such, scientific experts have 
personal and disciplinary responsibility for their communication, and thus at least in part, 
a wider responsibility for the role of intelligence in investigations and for scientific evi-
dence in court. 
In response to the exposure of mistakes, misrepresentations, and misunderstandings 
of DNA evidence that have led to failed investigations or miscarriages of justice, there 
have been efforts to regulate forensic science [64]. Political crises induced by a wrongful 
conviction or scandal have most often proven necessary to provoke regulatory interven-
tion, but this may come too late for an individual who cannot be adequately compensated 
for their loss of liberty or diverse publics whose trust in the administration of justice is 
irreparably damaged. In addition, the implementation of such regulation, including the 
writing of standards and operating procedures not underpinned by rigorous research, has 
been criticised [65]. It also remains the case that error rates and limitations of techniques 
often remain sufficiently unarticulated, or even undetermined. Yet even assuming extra 
resources are provided to produce robust error rates, it is questionable whether risks can 
be meaningfully quantified, given the inherently contextual nature of forensic DNA evi-
dence. As we argue, many questions are not purely scientific but include ethical consid-
erations from the very outset of the social life of DNA. Acceptability of DNA evidence 
thus turns, in part, upon the criminal justice system’s values and public tolerance of error, 
but classic regulatory risk analysis typically takes little (if any) account of sociological, 
economic, ethical, or even legal considerations. The countervailing difficulty of encourag-
ing innovation and development within regulatory parameters, demands innovative so-
lutions operating within an ‘ethics as lived practice’ framework. This will require embed-
ded ethical practice, as well as regulatory flexibility and pluralism, to avoid stagnation, 
and setting forensic science ‘in aspic’ [66]. 
 Such flexibility to innovate is especially critical when also facing the challenges of 
commercialization, leading to the confluence of competition and profit-oriented practices 
with those of scientific endeavour and of the criminal justice system. This confluence can 
lead most obviously to conflicts of interest, which can affect the portrayal of validity/reli-
ability and utility of forensic technologies, but also directly impact the quality of forensic 
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analyses undertaken; the reporting of these forensic analyses, and also the scientifically 
robust development of existing and emerging forensic technologies [67–69]. Forensic sci-
entists constantly make ethical decisions in this context, as discussed above for scientific 
and evidentiary reasons. In the commercial context, additionally, forensic practitioners 
make ethical decisions around accreditation for services; negotiating access to contracts; 
customer satisfaction; access to material and financial means in order to conduct research; 
contestations around other service providers, etc. [33]. Many scientists work together with 
companies in developing forensic technologies, equipment, and also at times, services. 
They may be delivering services for commercial providers, or they may be in direct com-
petition. Due to the potential conflicts of interest, the commercial context makes it even 
more important for forensic scientists and practitioners to reflect on their decision-making 
in order to ensure responsible and accountable delivery of forensic genetics analyses and 
interpretations. 
7. Case Studies 
Our call to adopt ethics as lived practice in decision-making processes throughout 
key stages in the life of forensic DNA is underscored by three case studies. These vignettes 
explore ethical decision-making in forensic DNA phenotyping, forensic (or: investigative) 
genetic genealogy, and forensic epigenetics. The three fields share a common basis: they 
are presented by forensic scientists and users as providing intelligence for investigations 
without apparent leads by generating data on a group of suspects, and they are portrayed 
to facilitate even cold case investigations, based on probability calculations and human 
(epi)genetics. 
7.1. Forensic DNA Phenotyping (FDP) and Biogeographic Ancestry Testing (BGA) 
FDP and BGA have provided intelligence to criminal investigations that, at times, 
have resulted in the detection of suspects. To date, in the USA, hundreds of investigations 
have drawn on intelligence from FDP and BGA analyses since 2015. In Europe, these tech-
niques (especially BGA), have found application in cases since at least 1999, including in 
the Marianne Vaatstra case [70]; the investigation of the Madrid train bombings of 2004 
[71]; the Phantom of Heilbronn investigation in 2008 [72]; and the detection of the murder 
of Eva Blanco Puig in Spain in 2015. In the Vaatstra case in 1999, an early form of BGA 
was used to the effect of taking public pressure off asylum seekers who had been consid-
ered prime suspects. In the Madrid investigation, the BGA analysis contributed some in-
telligence to the investigation. In the case of the Phantom of Heilbronn, the results did not 
contribute to the detection of perpetrators; rather, they seemed to fuel the bias of investi-
gators. While the case of the Phantom was widely debated, unsuccessful applications of 
FDP or BGA tend not to be discussed publicly. Yet insight into limitations can assist the 
wider forensic genetics community of scientists and users, but also the public, in under-
standing the effective parameters of these techniques. 
A more recent case is the rape and murder of Maria Ladenburger, on 16 October 2016, 
in the German city of Freiburg im Breisgau, Germany. At the start of the investigation, 
suspicion quickly fell on the large migrant community of approximately one million peo-
ple who had come to Germany in 2015/16. Representatives from politics, policing and fo-
rensic genetics suggested that expanded DNA technologies would contribute to faster de-
tection of the perpetrator if only analyses of the perpetrator’s (1) appearance, using FDP, 
and (2) continental origin, via BGA, would have been permitted. While many German 
experts, including the German Spurenkommission (trace commission), initially argued 
that the Ladenburger murder would have been an ideal test case for application of FDP 
in a criminal investigation, senior German forensic geneticists working on FDP later com-
mented that this specific case would not have benefitted from its use [73–75]. Yet, the 
raised expectations of audiences and investigators remained unrealistically high, leading 
to the legalization of FDP in Germany in 2019. Yet the Maria Ladenburger case was solved 
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through traditional police investigative techniques, resulting in the arrest of Hussein 
Khavari, an Afghan migrant, previously convicted in Greece. 
The discussion of FDP and BGA, in this case, has raised several questions, specifically 
around the communication of the utility and reliability of these emerging technologies, 
but also about the implications of using technology that aims to identify categories of peo-
ple rather than individuals [20,76]. Overall, FDP and BGA raise a number of ethical ques-
tions for forensic scientists, questions that need to be reflected upon time and again in 
order to deliver responsible and accountable science. While we focus on the estimation of 
externally visible characteristics in this case study, we do acknowledge that the testing of 
biogeographic ancestry (BGA) has its own technical and ethical pitfalls, some of which it 
shares with FDP and some of which are specific to BGA. For example, there are significant 
incongruities between ‘population’ labels used by the forensic laboratory and those used 
by police forces which risk miscommunications, while opening up casework to being 
highly susceptible to bias (e.g., [72]). 
First, FDP works on the basis of attribution rather than identification. However, de-
fining visible/external attributes, e.g., hair/eye/skin colour, must be couched in ambiguity 
because they are subject to individual evaluation, e.g., colour perception, but also cultur-
ally informed perception of such traits (see further [15]). These individual attributions are 
then compared to non-uniform standards. Here also, as mentioned earlier, the choice of 
reference data has a fundamental influence, requiring forensic scientists to reflect on the 
biases that go into defining reference data. In many cases, DNA analysis results might be 
meaningless or even misleading. Articulating such crucial limitations and distinctions to 
users is central to ensuring the reliability and utility of FDP in an investigation, even if 
reporting forms seem to leave scant space for such important information. Space and time 
must be made for communicating these aspects since they can significantly impact the 
understanding investigators develop of intelligence generated via FDP analyses. 
Second, the investigative value of forensic genetics arises from the capacity of tech-
nology to either deliver evidence or intelligence to detect crimes and perpetrators. In the 
case of FDP, intelligence is produced only in as far as the genetic analysis can either point 
towards (or away from) a group of shared attributes/characteristics a perpetrator may 
have. FDP is about shared characteristics and as such applies suspicion to groups, collec-
tivising suspicion [77]. However, since FDP deals in probabilities, the extent to which a 
group can be excluded can never be 100% certain. A key issue here is that the technology 
works best on minority groups (of an appearance distinctly different to that of a majority 
population) to deliver on its aim of directing the next steps in an investigation (e.g., [78]). 
It is thus vital to reflect when using technologies such as FDP, on their investigative value, 
which is reduced when the analysis points towards a majority group as then the expected 
‘reduction’ in suspect populations is not achieved. Effectively, this may lead to minority 
groups being implicated in active investigations more often because the investigative tools 
work less well in the case of majority populations [79]. At the same time, forensic technol-
ogies such as FDP do not work in isolation from policing practices and institutional cul-
tures [21]. Therefore, forensic scientists need to reflect on the discriminatory power of the 
technology that lies at its heart-both at policing and at public levels. This was the case in 
the Ladenburger investigation where non-European migrants were associated with crim-
inal behaviour because of the way that FDP was, for a long period of time, communicated 
as the key technological solution to violent crime investigations. 
Third, and this may be the most apparent element to forensic scientists, FDP remains 
an emerging technology. While pigmentation analyses may be well advanced for darker 
and lighter aspects of the continuum, medium levels of pigmentation remain more diffi-
cult to test for reliably (e.g., [80]). Furthermore, public debates between politicians, police, 
and scientists around the Ladenburger case confused the technology readiness level of 
FDP: while scientists were talking about lab-based levels of testing and aspirations for 
future analytical capacities, perhaps even up to “facial composites”, publics, politicians 
and police representatives perceived of these capacities as already realised and ready for 
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use. Key messages around the reliability and utility of FDP were mixed up. This may yet 
result in a significant loss of trust in the technology and forensic science in policing should 
its legalisation in Germany in 2019 not lead to any significant positive results in investi-
gations in the near future. 
7.2. Forensic Genetic Genealogy (FGG) 
From 1974 to 1986 in California, USA, crimes including murder and rape, were com-
mitted by the same unknown individual. In 2018, investigators uploaded genetic infor-
mation derived from crime scenes onto the public-access genetic ancestry database, GED-
match. This database aggregates genetic information from citizens who upload the results 
of their direct-to-consumer genetic tests from genealogy companies, such as Ances-
tryDNA, 23andMe, MyHeritage, and FamilyTreeDNA. Investigators found partial DNA 
matches assumed to belong to distant relatives, which enabled the creation of a ‘family 
tree’, primarily based on online genealogy database records, and including information 
from sources such as social media and other records. The data of these records sit outside 
of the forensic domain, and their use in policing raises a number of legal and ethical ques-
tions, including on the level of appropriate consent; dual/unintended use of data; and 
whether the capacity exists or can be introduced for blocking or deleting data from such 
sources if data subjects disagree with law enforcement uses of their data. Consequently, 
Joseph James DeAngelo, 72 years old, was identified as a suspect, and his “abandoned” 
DNA collected to facilitate confirmatory DNA analysis. Although the Golden State Killer 
was not the first case in which this technique has been used, it has become what Prainsack 
and Toom [81] term a “founding myth” and is being enthusiastically explored by police 
globally, and several cases have now been solved through FGG internationally. According 
to Kling et al. [82], FGG has been used to generate investigative leads in nearly 200 cold 
cases and some active investigations (see also [10,83,84]). In Sweden, prosecutors have 
allowed investigators to use consumer genealogy databases to solve cold cases: missing 
persons and a criminal case [85]. In Canada, two cold cases have been solved through 
forensic genealogy [8]. In the UK, a study has assessed the likely effectiveness of long-
range familial searches through GEDmatch [86]. The Golden State Killer also sparked in-
terest in this procedure among citizens and the companies offering these services, with 
existing databases now allowing for and, in some cases, encouraging law enforcement 
searches, as in the case with GEDmatch (recently acquired by commercial forensic service 
provider Verogen which raises further ethical issues which we do not have the space to 
explore here) and FamilyTreeDNA. In addition, services exclusively dedicated to law en-
forcement searches, e.g., DNASolves, DNA.Land, Geneanet, and Geni, are emerging [82] 
and some law enforcement agencies are setting up their own FGG services. 
The ethical implications of FGG are wide-ranging. First, this technique increases 
acutely the amount of information that can be garnered from DNA data, as it makes use 
of a significant number of markers and uses SNPs, instead of a relatively reduced number 
of markers and STRs, as used in ‘traditional’ forensic DNA testing and databases. Genetic 
genealogy also allows users to identify distant relatives [34,35] and disease predisposi-
tions. 
Second, FGG challenges the notion of what constitutes a DNA database used for law 
enforcement. Until recently, forensic DNA databases were solely constituted of DNA pro-
files of individuals with some degree of involvement with the criminal justice system [36]. 
Yet suspects are now being searched for in databases consisting of voluntarily uploaded 
genetic data from citizens who wish to know more about their health, ancestry, and/or 
search for relatives: a clear example of ‘function creep’. Such repurposing of DNA data 
requires a discussion of (informed) consent [33], data ownership, and the accountability 
of genealogy companies and law enforcement in relation to human rights. 
Third, the genetic databases being used/created for FGG usually have a significantly 
different composition than “traditional” forensic databases, the latter over-representing 
groups that are most likely to interact with the criminal justice system, such as racial and 
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ethnic minorities [87] while genetic genealogy databases are mainly composed of an eco-
nomically privileged and a European-descent population [51]. This leads to the expansion 
of affected populations as involvement with the criminal justice system is no longer a pre-
requisite to inclusion in law enforcement searches and follows broader patterns of sur-
veillance expansion that encompasses ever more citizens. FGG, therefore, brings individ-
uals whose profiles are in a recreational DNA database, under the ‘genetic surveillance’ 
gaze, making them suspects by association [88]. This ‘function creep’ illustrates the poten-
tial for wider ramifications of decisions that are particularly risky when impacts cannot 
be known and their diffusion across society remains uncharted. However, it should be 
noted that different databases have varying policies in terms of making genetic data avail-
able for law enforcement searches [89] GEDmatch and FamilyTreeDNA encourage such 
searches. GEDmatch offers users to opt-in while FamilyTreeDNA, in 2019, instituted an 
opt-out policy that automatically opens up users’ data to law enforcement searches. How-
ever, under the jurisdiction of the European Union’s General Data Protection Regulation 
(GDPR), users from current and recent European Union member states who have profiles 
on FamilyTreeDNA have been automatically opted out. This means that European Union 
citizens must opt-in if they wish to have their DNA profile included for criminal investi-
gation purposes [8,54]. Adopting a different stance, companies such as AncestryDNA and 
23andMe have categorically denied access for law enforcement agents to such data, unless 
subpoenaed by a court order to do so [89]. 
7.3. Forensic Epigenetics/-Genomics (FEpi) 
Imagine: A woman is found dead, and DNA samples collected from crime scenes do 
not provide any investigative leads. After making a genetic estimation of appearance traits 
and biogeographic ancestry (see case 1), it is decided to conduct epigenetic prediction of 
chronological age [90], as well as epigenomic prediction of lifestyle and environmental 
factors through the DNA samples. Results indicate that the presumed suspect is approxi-
mately twenty years old, smokes tobacco, has a high alcohol intake, and probably belongs 
to a specific “socioeconomic status”(p. 7, [91]). Based on these results, police investigative 
work will be prioritised towards a more specific suspect pool. While hypothetical, this is 
the aspiration of forensic epigenetics. 
Until recently, despite the enormous interest in post-genomics research, forensic ap-
plications of epigenetics were mainly restricted to body fluid identification, differentiating 
between monozygotic twins, and age prediction [90,92,93]. The potential uses of epigenet-
ics in forensic research have only recently expanded, with expectations that the under-
standing of how environmental factors impact our DNA might be useful ‘intelligence’, by 
identifying suspects’ lifestyle, such as smoking habits, alcohol intake, other drug use, diet, 
body shape and size, physical exercise, zone of residence, and socioeconomic status 
[91,94]. As with FGG, the potential ramifications of FEpi are extensive and impossible to 
fully predict, when technology is still in an embryonic life stage. It is thus critical that 
potential consequences are contemplated to develop anticipatory capacity. 
First, revealing lifestyle and environmental characteristics directly interferes with the 
right to privacy of individuals and populations. Despite arguments—already expressed 
and disputed [15]—that “the genetic prediction of obvious appearance traits [such as 
smoking] because their external visibility cannot be considered private” (p. 8, [91]), it is 
clear that inferring smoking, drinking and drug and food consumption habits indirectly 
correlates with health information and medical conditions, further blurring the distinction 
between forensic and medical uses of genetic data. 
Second, we might question how useful information about smoking and drinking hab-
its might be for investigators since the indication that a suspect smokes and/or consumes 
alcohol does not significantly advance a criminal investigation without any suspects. Sim-
ilar to FDP (case 1) and FGG (case 2), FEpi casts suspicion across entire groups by cluster-
ing ‘suspect’ populations that share certain lifestyles. 
Genes 2021, 12, 1868 13 of 17 
 
 
Third, epigenetic markers are, to a considerable extent, established in early develop-
ment, potentially transmissible to subsequent generations, and sensitive to environmental 
factors and lifestyles [95–97]. If we look back to the hypothetical criminal case and focus 
upon the information that the presumed suspect is approximately twenty years old, 
smokes, has a significant alcohol intake, we must take into consideration i) that maternal 
smoking and alcohol consumption during pregnancy could cause epigenetic changes in 
the offspring; ii) passive smoking also might impact the epigenome; iii) alcohol-dependent 
epigenetic signatures are partly reversible upon abstinence [91,94]. This suggests that the 
variability of epigenetic markers does not constitute reliable or consistent predictors for 
identifying suspects. Although FEpi is still being developed in terms of scientific valida-
tion, an approach that is anchored in ethics as lived practice implies that issues around 
reliability, utility, and legitimacy [20] must be considered focal points to be addressed and 
discussed. 
8. Concluding Remarks 
As science is afforded a particularly powerful role in knowledge production and 
meaning-making in the criminal justice system, could this lead to a ‘technological tyranny’ 
[98] in which individuals and communities have to prove their innocence against proba-
bilities? Might forensic scientists inadvertently contribute to creating new kinds of ine-
qualities and insecurity when it comes to policing and criminal justice? (p. 365, [99]). In 
response to such questions, particularly facing forensic geneticists, in this paper we pro-
pose a move from the dominant “thin” ethics approach, to one of ethics as lived practice. 
We argue that forensic scientists are ethical agents, that is, they make ethical decisions 
daily and not just at procedural moments such as requesting ethics approval or reporting 
to an institutional review board. Rather, they have the agency and power to make deci-
sions with far-reaching impacts. Such decision-making can be more apparent at some 
points than others and must go some way to building ‘anticipatory capacity’ for the gov-
ernance of reliable and responsible forensic genetics. In this paper, we have articulated 
some of the key stages in the life of forensically relevant (epi)genetic data at which ethical 
decision-making takes place, and where it is vital to take the time to reflect on ethical 
principles and practices. Our aim has been to raise awareness of the need for continuous 
reflection upon ethical decisions and to articulate some of those key instances in which 
such reflection is clearly vital. 
Key lessons: 
1. Anticipatory capacity and ethics as lived practice are vital components of the work 
of forensic scientists. This implies the need to be able to anticipate how technology 
use will impact individuals and groups of people potentially drawn into investiga-
tions, as well as wider community relationships, and criminal justice more generally. 
Our first key point is that forensic geneticists need to engage with ethics in all stages 
of the sample and data life cycle. 
2. There is an urgent need to address the power of forensic (epi)genetics to cast suspi-
cion over a wide range of individuals and communities who may share visual char-
acteristics, common family ancestry, and/or lifestyle habits. This poses several issues 
that forensic genetics should be aware of when developing and/or applying such 
technologies, as we move towards a society where individuals and even communities 
are increasingly called upon to prove their innocence. Our second key point, there-
fore, is that forensic geneticists need to be aware of the active role that their research 
and technologies can play in either strengthening or threatening such fundamental 
legal principles as the presumption of innocence, equality of arms, and the legal bur-
den of proof. 
3. Our third key point is that clarity and open communication about real-world capac-
ities of technologies such as FDP, FGG, and FEpi (as well as BGA which is not dis-
cussed in depth in this paper) must be at the core of discussions around their use. 
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Their reliability and effectiveness outside the laboratory, and their utility for specific 
cases, must be reflected upon, and openly and clearly articulated to users and com-
missioners of such technologies in order to build legitimacy, including public trust, 
responsible innovation and practice, and accountability. 
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